The Wandering of a Philosopher

On The Shortcomings of Rorty’s Epistemological Behaviorism: Issues of Power Relations in Theory and Practice.

Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature aims to revive pragmatism in the light of modern Anglophone academic philosophy, which, according to him, has founded itself in an ontological view of truth. He writes, “Our present notions of what it is to be a philosopher are so tied up with Kantian attempt to render all knowledge-claims commensurable that it is difficult to imagine what philosophy without epistemology could be.”(Rorty, 357) By the “Kantian attempt to render all knowledge-claims commensurable” Rorty centers around this idea that the privileged discourses of science and philosophy of mind revolve around an idea of truth that transcends history and social context and which is universal. Through what he refers to as epistemological behaviorism, Rorty aims at edifying academic philosophy by unsettling these privileged discourses.  As he writes, “Explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by the former, is the essence of what I shall call ‘epistemological behaviorism,’ an attitude common to Dewey and Wittgenstein.” (Rorty, 174)In other words, truth is no longer transcendent, it is no longer a-historical or universal, but rather it becomes deeply embedded within our socio-historical contexts. Rorty revives a new kind of pragmatism that is influenced by the works of Heidegger and Wittgenstein. He proposes that philosophy asks the question of “what works?” rather than looking for a foundational objective truth.

 In this paper, I shall critically assess this concept of epistemological behaviorism as a possible valid assertion of truth and purpose of philosophy by showing its shortcomings. First I shall look over what pragmatism has to say on the subject of truth, knowledge and practice. Afterwards it will be my aim to critically engage this view by comparing it to relations of power and knowledge, which the philosopher Michel Foucault demonstrates in his work The Subject and Power. In the end, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate how Rorty’s neo-pragmatism fails to address issues of oppression in Western Society by challenging its areas of blindness.

I. The Pragmatist View of Practice and Truth.

Let us go back to Rorty’s notion of epistemological behaviorism. We must first examine how is this neo-pragmatism is described before we can make any critical assertions about it. As described above, Rorty introduces a new kind of pragmatism — still influenced by James and Dewey — that introduces new ideas from the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Rorty’s view of pragmatism now includes hermeneutics. In order to understand how this creates a difference in Rorty’s idea of truth and practice we must understand that pragmatism is not a philosophy of epistemology, but rather a social philosophy. As a method, pragmatism asks “what difference would it make practically to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true?”(James, 26)

Pragmatism asks a question of practicality, one that is essentially bounded up with the social world. This can be contrasted with epistemology, in which the center of authority is rationality and commensurability. Pragmatism focuses on the consequences of the ways truth and practice shape our lives. Now it is important to note that James and even Rorty do not deny the importance of scientific discourse in western society. Philosophy, on the other hand, needs to concern itself with questions of the good life and value. Hence pragmatism creates a relationship between truth and practice, one that focuses on the relevancy of a certain belief as something that influences our life. “There is nothing philosophically interesting about truth. What is interesting lies in the beliefs themselves, in their referential structure and their intertwining with our living.” (May, 56) This relationship between belief and practice aligns itself with a holistic view of society. A change in the world can affect how people will act, and a change in action may induce a change in the world. The world and the individual are reconnected through practice. Thus, this epistemological notion of commensurability and universality is unsettled.  In terms of individuals, there is no longer this universal commonality with others.

In order to reconnect individual’s discourses together, Rorty integrates hermeneutics as a new dimension of human relationships. Hermeneutics is a theory of understanding and interpretation. For Gadamer, a main exponent in hermeneutic, being human means being invested into language, (understood as a background of meaning we grow into)  because it is through language that the world reveals itself to us in the way we see it. For example, the computer that I am using right now shows up and reveals itself as a computer, a machine that I can use to write papers and access online data, but not as weapon or a plate. This revealing aspect of experience happens through language, it determines the meaning of computers and thus makes it possible for it to reveal itself to me as a computer. But language is not a fixed entity; rather it is shaped and affected by our history and social context. On this account, while the computer reveals itself to me as a machine for a certain purpose, it may reveal itself as a brute object to throw at people. Thus, on the hermeneutic view, meaning is historically grounded and entities reveal themselves on the basis of this historicality. This view of interpretation does not only apply to objects, but to everything. Even humans are included in this view, as Heidegger writes “language is the house of being,” for language, as a background of meaning, gives the possibility for the other beings to reveal themselves as they do. The way we interpret our relationships as human beings, as coworkers, as academics, as friends, and as a culture or society is thus mediated through language, and made possible. And we all understand ourselves as such, because we share this historical common ground in which meaning develops. Thus Rorty uses of Hermeneutics as a tactic to thread together individual’s discourses on a more historical and common basis, rather than on a universal epistemological matrix. Hermeneutics becomes an expression of hope for Rorty, one that will overcome these demands of constraint and confrontation that our culture has privilege through epistemology.

“Hermeneutics sees the relations between various discourses as those of     strands in a possible conversation, a conversation which presupposes no disciplinary matrix which unites the speakers, but where the hope of agreement is never lost as long as the conversation lasts.” (Rorty, 318)

In other words, human discourse, through the use of hermeneutics, is no longer guided by a specific disciplinary matrix that we all agree on (i.e. epistemology). Rather it is based on a shared historical system of meaning discourse is possible. Because we do not all share the same historical background, our conversation and sense of community can develop in a deeper and more meaningful fashion. This for Rorty is the way in which philosophers need to change, by opening themselves to new views of truth, knowledge and practice and not try to reduce them all to a single disciplinary matrix. In relation to pragmatism, hermeneutics now gives the possibility to ask, “what works?” in a broader and more historical sense than James or Dewey could have done. So, epistemological behaviorism is founded on cultural authority, and is open to outside perceptions rather than privileging some universal structure. Truth becomes applicable only in so far as it is hermeneutically relevant and qualitative. It itself becomes practice; as the only entities that count as truth is now hermeneutically harmonious and benefiting to our practical life.

II. The Foucaultian view of Practice and Truth

As we have seen, practice is no longer a question that grounds itself on a notion of foundational truth, rather truth is a function of practice (practicality or actions now define the relevancy of truth). It becomes ultimately bounded with the social world. In other words, the social realm becomes the epistemological authority on what counts as truth and what does not. Because truth now becomes a role of practice, we must ask ourselves what makes practice the way it is? Who or what influences practice?  How does certain practical affairs come to be rather than others? and eventually come to the question of qui buono? or who does this benefit? On the epistemological view, all of these questions can be answered with rationality, and because it is neutral and universal it is also equally benefiting for all. But Rorty fails to answer these questions in details, which leave him blinded to certain notions of power relations and issues of practice/theory. “Rorty’s pragmatism focuses too much on community, and gives insufficient attention to the workings of power relations between theory and practice.” (Bickford,1) In order to understand what Bickford means by her statement, and understand why it is a problem we need to turn to the philosopher Michel Foucault. In his essay, The Subject and Power, Foucault gives us an overview of power relations and how they work.

“What defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on actions existing or on those, which may arise in the present or the future.” (Foucault, 789)

In Foucault power is equivocated with governing, in the sense that it is what make the possible fields of action already possible. Power is that which creates the structure for the range of behavioristic possibilities that exists in our society. It influences our present and future possible actions as to determine the field of what is possible and what is not possible to practice. In a way, power influences what we may understand as normal or abnormal, true or not true, what works or what doesn’t work. As May writes,

“What counts as success as well as what is encouraged or discouraged (or even prohibited) in the name of that success are political matters. They are matters of whom we have been shaped to be and what our understanding and self-understanding consists in.”(May, 61)

In other words, we understand ourselves in a certain manner. We understand the world in a certain way as well, which we then relate back to our self-understanding. I already have an understanding of what it means to be successful, and thus I interpret my self and actions on this notion. Whether I am successful or not is already determined by those power relations. In so far as we grow uncritically into structures of practice, these understandings and self-understandings make sense and can be justified. (May, 60)  Hence, because I grow into these structures of practice, I regulate my behavior in relation to these understandings and self-understandings in such a way that I can justify it. These practices are forms of knowledge, which we take to be true. For example, the medical practice creates knowledge of the physical body, in turn that knowledge encourages or discourages certain behaviors or actions. I behave on the basis of a certain ideas of how I understand my physical body, one that has already been legitimated by power relations working through institutions. I exercise, I eat three times a day, I drink a certain amount of water etc. and with these truths created by the medical institution I adapt my behavior to be more “healthy “and “normal”. This knowledge, which is power, regulates my possible field of actions and encourages certain behaviors over others. Unlike in the pragmatist view, Foucault sees truth not as a function of practice, but as a function of power. A different kind of holism takes place when introducing power relations. One in which power relations influence the world, and the world influences power relations. “Power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus, not reconstituted “above” society as a supplementary structure whose radical effacement one could perhaps dream of.” (Foucault, 791)

Power is deeply woven in this “social nexus,” it cannot be taken out of this context, without power relations society would just be an abstract thought. And thus since the individual is part of a society, he takes part in these power relations, promotes them and reproduces them. But power is different from violence or forceful submission. Power can only exists in relation to free subjects, only to the extent that I have a field of possibilities in which I can act. Power is only effective as such in so far as it is exercised behind our back, as long as we are free subjects that do not experience a form of violent submission, power is possible. “It would not be possible for power relations to exists without points of insubordinations which, by definition, are means of escape.” (Foucault, 794) But this does not mean that we are able to brake away from power relations, it merely means that there is a possibility of reformation that exists as a condition (or even pre-condition) in power relations.

III. Conclusion: Rorty’s Areas of Blindness

Now we understand truth as a function of power, and not a function of practice, we open up a space in which the previously raised questions can be answered. “Rorty’s approach misunderstands the nature of power and the relations between theory and practice.” (Bickford, 105) A notion of power is still present in Rorty, but one that is fluid and easily reformed, one that can be shaped to benefit our lives. Rorty’s view of power is one that can be reconstituted “above” as a supplementary structure of society, which Foucault denies. These “good beliefs” that will deepen and widen our society and lives is already hermeneutically possible and accessible. This notion of change in communication and relation with others is not the problem. Rather Rorty overlooks what Bickford wants to ask in her paper: who gets to change these beliefs? and what are the consequences of reforming truth in this way? (Bickford 106)

In my view, Rorty’s neo-pragmatism overlooks two oppressive problems. The first is contained within this ability to reform of truth as a function of practice (Which Bickford critics as well). The second concerns his use of hermeneutics as a way to reconnect individual’s discourses in a way that deepens our sense of community and conversation. Both problems are related to each other, but for the point of this paper I shall first address them separately and reunite them afterwards.

Truth as a function of practice overlooks certain aspects of  power relations, which as we have said, already opens up a field of possibilities in which individuals can act.

“Although ostensibly based on a view of that community as a contingent result of a particular historical circumstances, [Rorty]actually ends up ignoring the context that structures those communities, and the different relationship to them that different kinds of people (women, for example) might have.” (Bickford,107)

In other words, those power relations that Foucault mentions, are already deeply present and woven in our cultural context and regulate how different groups of individual relate to each other. These understandings of relations between groups of people encourage and discourage certain behaviors and actions. These self-regulating behaviors are already deeply rooted in the context of a community’s structure and legitimated by power relations working through institution. Women, for example, who live in a patriarchal society are already taking part in behaviors and actions that  promotes and reproduce an understanding of society as patriarchal. It is nothing voluntary, in fact we grow into these notions of society and uncritically assume them as normal, or even natural. The behavior that women must assume in western society is already shaped by power relations, which today are essentially patriarchal.

This creates a position of oppression towards women (and other minority groups) that is so deeply woven in our society. Asking this question of “what works?” (truth as a function of practice) without being aware of power relation becomes dangerous. By doing so we might fall into an uncritical view of society, one that promotes an oppressive state towards others because it is only normal. Who is to benefit from Rorty’s pragmatism? The white heterosexual male of course! Since he is the center of the universe, all others must reduce themselves to him. As Bickford writes, “the unpleasant implication of this [pragmatism] is that a ‘deepening our sense of community’ could also be read [as] ‘requiring others to be like us before allowing them to participate in our conversation’” (Bickford, 106) If truth is only a matter of “what works” then it becomes blind to issues of oppression and may even silence voices by categorizing them as not “making any sense.”

This brings us up to the second problem mentioned above. Unlike the first problem, which lines up with pragmatism in general, this one is much more aligned with Rorty’s epistemological pragmatism.  As we have seen, hermeneutics is the new way with which he reconnects individual’s discourses after having dismissed the idea of a commensurable and universal form of understanding. In hermeneutics everything meaningful is a part of language, thus everything is language. This view that everything meaningful (as in understandable and of value) is a part of language already silences anything that falls outside of it. Because we are already intertwined within this hermeneutic situation, anything outside of it is considered unsignificant. In other words, even if “what works” were to be considered beneficial to our society, it can never stand outside of this hermeneutic situation, and is therefore already limited to meanings and values that we have grown into (such as patriarchal values in language). But even more problematic, is that it considers these experiences that fall outside of language as having no value, no form in which to be expressed and thus are tossed aside and categorized as insane.  This view leaves out experiences that have no language in which they can reveal themselves as such. Even though hermeneutics is a way to deepen and widen our conversations, it already alienates certain experiences (such as trauma, and being a minority in a society) from even being considered as rational or understandable. Going back to the example of women, she can only express her situation in a patriarchal context that is already deeply rooted in our language. Thus she must use the language that oppresses her in order to describe her oppression. This is problematic because it already limits what she can say about her experience, and if taken uncritically can even be considered as insane and valueless.

In conclusion, Rorty’s pragmatism already alienates other groups of people from these meaningful conversations by not paying attention to ways in which power relations affect practice. Truth and language as functions of power, which are already deeply woven in our society and culture, creates a condition for oppression. As those conditions for oppression are not critically engaged, neo-pragmatism also silences the words of others on the account of not conforming to the normative form of discourse. Critically engaging power relations “shifts the pragmatist view from one of ‘what works?’ to one  of ‘how does it work?’ This productive methodological shift at once challenges pragmatism’s areas of blindness and opens it to more subtle political perspective.” (May, 54)

Works Cited

Bickford, Susan. “Why We Listen to Lunatics: Antifoundational Theories and Feminist Politics.” Hypatia 8.2 (1993): 104-23. Philosopher’s Index. Web. 12 Apr. 2012.

Foucault, Michel. “The Subject and Power.” Critical Inquiry. Vol. 8. University of Chicago, 1982. 777-95. Print. Ser. 4.

James, William. Pragmatism. New York: Dover, 1995. 26. Print.

May, Todd. “A New Neo-Pragmatism: From James and Dewey to Foucault.” Foucault Studies. Queensland University of Technology, 2011. 54-62. Print. Ser. 11.

Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2009. Print.

A Marxist Reading of Pokemon

Being a highly culturally relevant show, Pokemon is deeply embedded within a capitalist system where the accumulation of goods – and pokemon - depicts a trainer’s social rank in his world and where the relationship between trainer and animal is one that discourages class consciousness. Pokemon expresses a deep capitalistic notion of economy that promotes the alienation of labor and tries to avoid class consciousness.

Capitalism for Marx is an economical system that breeds on the oppression of labor through its alienation.  There are four elements which the worker becomes alienated to, the first is his own product, the result of his labor is no longer something personal, it has become embedded within a system that mass produces it for another purpose than its own usefulness. It is no longer something of use value but rather something that has the purpose to be sold for profit. The second is his own labor, the worker no longer works for himself, and he works for the system, to be part of this homogeneity that holds the system together. The worker then becomes alienated from other human beings; they are going to start experiencing dehumanization of labor and lose their relations to others. You start to use others as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves and the fragmentation of the labor process destroys the human relations and breeds competition. It then becomes natural, as if this were always the case. Finally the worker himself begins to see himself as a means to an end; he is the worker of such factory and works over for such and such purposes. He becomes the means to profit.

All of this happens in a dialectical tension between, what Marx refers to as, the base and the superstructure, which create the capitalistic system that alienates the worker. The base is the support of the superstructure, if looking at a house for example it would be the ground holding up the structure of the house. Within the base you have the means of productions, which are the basic necessities of life, those means of production are controlled by the Bourgeoisie or the higher class. Then we have the modes of production, which is the way the productions is achieved, the “how” of producing. These modes of production include human labor power and the available knowledge related to the technology of the means of production and the social and economical relationship that people have to production in a particular era. The modes of production include the proletariat or working class, which works under the bourgeoisie.  The proletariat is the class being oppressed, in this capitalistic system, by being alienated from their labor and being oppressed by a Bourgeoisie that controls the means of production. This base is there to support the superstructure which includes elements like religion, state, education, kinship, culture, arts and mass media. Between the base and the superstructure we have a dialectical tension which means that if anything changes in the base the superstructure will be affected and the superstructure legitimates the base. Now if this is done correctly and we are well embedded in the system, according to Marx, the base becomes invisible and we lose our awareness of it. 

The capitalistic economical system is one that looks to produce and acquire as much surplus as possible in order to become successful and rich. It replaces the use-value of the product (the utility of a product as the base for its value) with an exchange value (creates value through its possibility of being exchanged). This creates an opening for surplus value of commodities (objects outside of us which satisfy human desire).

Pokemon revolves around the story of a young trainer named Ash Ketchum who wants to become the most successful pokemon trainer in history. In order to do so he must win pokemon battles, gain respect and badges from arenas across the country and catch as many pokemons as he can. The show provides a very vivid example of a relation between proletariat and Bourgeoisie. The pokemon (proletariat), little creatures with special abilities, are carried around by their trainers (Bourgeoisie) who use them in battles in order to increase their own ranks in the pokemon world. The pokemons are used as modes of production for the trainer which creates a hierarchical relationship between pokemons revolving around their usefulness.  In other words, the trainer will use his stronger pokemons before he can use his weaker less useful ones. The pokemons, on the other hand, feel guilty if they cannot produce the amount of useful needed by the trainer and thus create a sort of competition between each other. The amount of usefulness a pokemon can exemplify in battle will result in the trainer putting him in the starting six that he may be used to gain the fame and power he wants to acquire. The trainer also controls the means by which this production of power and fame is created; he is the one to decide what to buy in order to increase his pokemon success in battle (medicinal herbs, berries, strength increasing pills, antivenom etc.) and increase his own success rate at catching better and stronger pokemons (different types of poke balls).

In this case we can see how the pokemon is being alienated. One he is alienated from his product, the power and fame that the trainer gets is in no way related to the pokemon itself. And if it is, only in the fact that the trainer was the one to raise him in such a way that he could achieve such high level. The labor no longer reflects who the pokemon is but rather who the trainer is. He also become alienated from his labor, he loses control of his laboring activities, the pokemon does not decide when or who to fight, the trainer makes this decision for him. He then becomes alienated from other pokemon. As I have touched earlier on this subject, a hierarchical structure is put in place between pokemon that are more powerful and useful compared to those who are not. This fragmentation of the labor process destroys the pokemon relation and breeds competition between one another. And finally the pokemon is alienated from himself, it start seeing himself as a means to an end, an end controlled by the trainer. As mentioned above, the pokemon is a means to the trainers’ gain of fame and power and feels guilty if he cannot be a part of this structure, even though it is not something that was chosen by the pokemon himself.  

The more the pokemon is able to produce this fame and power, the more he becomes alienated from himself and thus becomes more and more a commodity himself. The devaluation of the pokemon is directly proportionate to the increasing value of the fame and power the trainer acquires. The slogan “gotta catch’em all” shows how the pokemon is not a being but a thing, an object to be caught to assert a certain purpose – to catch’em all for fame and power. The pokemon again, is demonstrated to have become a means to an end, a thing used and easily replaceable by a better, stronger object. Even though the trainer might already have a Charizard, he does not want the weakest Charizard, he wants the most powerful one. The one that will provide him with this fame and power he so long for. The Pokémon’s entire life thus revolves around the ability to produce, not for himself, but for the trainer.

The class separation is not made obvious by the show; in fact it is made to be seen as perfectly normal, as though the pokemon/trainer relationship is necessary and natural. Class consciousness seems to have been eradicated in such a way that the pokemon doesn’t even see himself as part of an oppressed working class subdued by the bourgeoisie. The Pokémon’s alienation thus becomes perfectly normal and the just way of going about this world. In fact the show does not promote any kind of revolution from the part of the pokemon, and even if such an event would happen, the viewer would be prone to side with the trainers because unlike the pokemons, they are not defying the “natural” order of things.

Thus the pokemon world becomes a world where capitalism has taken over the economical system. A revolution is no longer possible by the proletariat since class consciousness can never be reached. The bourgeoisie will keep on controlling the means of production and the superstructure will keep in increasing its legitimacy to future generations. 

Visual Art as a Powerful and Influential Mode of Communication

In history we can look at different art forms that are representational of a society during a period in time. From the primitive cave drawings of ancient ages to the super realism of the 20th we can observe how art has communicated aspects of a culture and what affect they had. In this paper I explore this idea of art as a non-verbal form of communication. I will explore its role within a society; both as a form of communication and expression, by looking at propaganda, protest art and as a unifying factor in society. With these elements I will show that art has a purpose in society as a powerful medium for expressing and communicating personal beliefs, identity and ideals.
      The first and foremost question to ask prior to this paper is one of necessity: what is art? Art in itself is a difficult phenomenon to define. Because of the ambiguity of this question it is important to look at it before continuing. Art is difficult to define because of the blurry boundaries that constitute what is art and what is not. For example a parent might convey a drawing made by their child or an art project as art, which to others may just be seen as a drawing or an art project and would not categorize them in the realm of art. In this sense we might see how some might arise from trying to have a consistent definition for the word art. Haselberger, a twentieth century anthropologist, defines art in its purely aesthetic characteristic. “Works of art,” he says,” can be identified in objects produced with the intention that they be aesthetically pleasing, not, pragmatically functional.” (Layton. 4) But even with this definition of art. it still seem that the ambiguity of the term has not yet been resolved. If a piece of art consists merely in its function of being aesthetically pleasing to the eye then we go back to the earlier problem of the child’s drawing. Aristotle exemplifies a different notion of the arts, as Layton explains. “He [Aristotle] pointed out that while poets make use of metre to order their words. a historian or a natural philosopher might choose to write his work according to metre. but although giving it a harmonious form this would not necessarily turn his work into poetry.” (Layton. 5) With this in mind art is no longer categorized by the form it takes, whether it is in the form of a or a painting or a sculpture. the “beautiful form” is no longer considered sufficient in order to describe what art is. For Aristotle art becomes how it is ordered, how the meaning of a “beautiful form” is communicated. He says. “the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphors. It is the one thing that cannot be learned from others: and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilar.” (Poetics. Ch 22) Now art is defined by the method through which it communicates its meaning. Thus with this definition in mind, the child’s drawing or project is no longer defined as art, it no longer survives in the realm next to master pieces in a museum, for it has no artistic perception, it has no metaphorical elements. Art now becomes a metaphorical method to communicate.

            That that we have a definition of art, the following must be asked. How is art created? Where does it originate? How is a meaning communicated in art? By what qualities is the artist able to create pleasure out of the aesthetic? and finally, as pointed by Aristotle. not everyone can create art which raises the question, how does the artist become an artist? These are important questions to ask, even if they deal in the realm of psychoanalytic, they represent a space between the definition of art and thesis. The answers to those questions represent the origin of art in the artist, the motivations and implications that come with the artist. This, as a result, will help clarify the role of art as a communicative/expressive tool for belief, ideas and identity. Also on a more basic term, because art is a non-verbal representational medium, it must always be interpreted and therefore lies in the psycho-analytic field. 

            Herbert Read, author of Art and Society, writes, “The theories of Freud, it is true, have not met universal acceptance, but though they may still require criticism … there are no longer any serious grounds for questioning their relevance. The general principles have already been already applied with great profit to fields as anthropology and mythology.” (Read. 83) There are two factors that present themselves in artistic conditions:

            1) The will of the individual, the will to create art for himself and for his art to be accepted by community. 

            2) The will of community or consumer, the will that accepts or rejects the creation on the bases of its usual cultural activity. 

The consumer accepts the creation on the foundation that it is appealing in its functionality or its pleasurable sensation. This opens the discourse for two psychoanalytic explorations. The first being the analysis of the creator’s mind, of the artist and the second being the exploration of the consumer’s mind. In order to comprehend the communicating factor of art, it is necessary to involve this analysis. to look at how the art is formed as a mode of communication and why/how it is received by the consumer. 

            The psycho-analytic interpretation of Freud starts manly with his theory of the Oedipus complex. When an individual is born he is first conscious of the mother. The child is conscious of whose womb he emerged out of and on whom he/she is dependent of. The mother thus represents a notion of security and stability. These experiences and attachments with the mother are libidinal in their nature, meaning that the child is driven by sex and hunger. as Read writes “the satisfaction of appetite, the creation of pleasure.” (read. 84) But soon after the child becomes aware of his surrounding world, that which is the external to the mother, to her breast and to her warmth he must adapt. When this happens he adapts anyway he can in order to survive in this outer element. When he becomes aware of the outer world, the child creates the image of an enemy to anyone who may threaten this bond between him/her and the mother. This first object of hate is the father, who creates a conflict of interest between the child and the mother. This conflict between the child and the father (and later on all of his surroundings) is what Freud refers to as the Oedipus complex, which creates results that may persist in the unconscious into adult life and creates a tension between what Freud calls the ego and the Id. To resolve the Oedipus complex the child has two possibilities according to Freud. The child may redirect the libidinal energy, that sexual drive was originally directed towards the mother, towards that which the mother had the most interest, that is his own body. This solution gives rise to a state of self love, and creating stability around it leads to homo-sexuality according to Freud. Usually this state is repressed and then the child focuses on the object which the mother’s interest was shared with, the father.  He thus imitates the father and tries to obtain an object on which he is able to direct his libidinal energy towards (a wife. a partner. girlfriend etc..). “Those who fail to adapt” Read summarizes “remain fixed at some intermediate stage and are therefore regarded by the normal majority as peculiar, or, to use the psychological term, psychotic.” (Read. 85) In simpler terms, those who fail to adapt to this “normality” lie in self deception, hallucination and madness.

            According to his text, the artist is always, somewhat, to be considered as psychotic. Although it may not be as objectively observable as the psychotic, he finds way to disguise and compensate for his psychosis. The artist is a disguised psychotic because, in a sense, he lives in a fantasy. a reality that is his own. But he is able to disguise it because he has found a way back from the fantasy and into reality - art. Freud exclaims “He [The artist] is one who is urged by instinctive needs which are too clamorous; he longs to attain to honor, power, riches, fame, and the love of women; but he lacks the means of achieving these gratifications.” (Freud. pg 314) These means that the artist lacks are physical strength and/ or personal charm, but because he does not have them he creates a reality of his own, a fantasy. He thus turns his entire world, his interests, and his libido towards the fabrication of this fantasy life from which might lead to neurosis. The artist’s way back into reality or normality is through his art, he is able to elaborate his day-dream his unconscious fantasy, to mold his thoughts and ideas into art, and he is able to externalize his fantasies outside of his mind. But he does not do so in just any manner, the true artist, according to Freud. is able to elaborate and mold his fantasy in way that are first of all faithful to his subjective but also in a manner that is pleasurable to the other, to the ones that live in the normality of the world. He is capable of universalizing his mental life. In order to do such a task the artist is has an admirable ability of repression, one so great that it is what opens up the possibility to be a true artist and not fall under complete neurosis.

            The artist though his bounded by the consumer’s view of his creation. The middle world of fantasy is closed off by the normal man, the man who lives within reality or normality, and according to Freud, “every hungry soul looks to it for comfort and consolation.” But this is difficult even for the true artist, the non-artist has a limited gratification that he can obtain from the creation of the creator. Their grim repression does not allow for such an opening of fantasy and therefore can never fully enjoy completely the piece of art that they are presented with. But the artist nonetheless needs their approval, their acceptance in order to disguise his psychosis. When the artist is able to objectify his fantasy into reality in a manner that is faithful and order he has then opened up a door for the others (the consumers) a “way back to comfort and consolation of their unconscious source of pleasure.” (Freud. pg 315) And by so the artist results in gaining appreciation and gratitude from the others, and thus is able to obtain all the desire that he was denied of before: honor, power, richness, and the love of women.

            The work of art itself is not presented in the previous analysis. In order to explain further how a work of art is related to politics, religion, moral and social idealism we look at Freud’s analysis of the mind. The mind is composed of three parts, the Id. the ego and the super ego. The id is “the obscure inaccessible part of our personality; the little we know about it we have learnt from the study of dream-work and the formation of the neurotic symptom, and most that is of a negative character, and can only be described as all that the ego is not.” (Freud. New introductory Lectures. pg 98) The id is the part of our unconscious which is driven by pure sexual or libidinal desire. As seen earlier, it is the predominant factor of a child’s life, for it is that which gives rise to that need for pleasure of satisfaction of hunger in the child. Its behavior is based on what Freud refers to as “the pleasure principle.” which is a psycho-analytic concept that describes the nature of desiring pleasure and avoiding pain. The id has no values, no morals, no good or evil, it just seeks pleasure. Pleasure in Freud’s view is unchanging and fixed, there Id does not change his pleasures, they remain as they are, meaning sexual and hunger. The ego is the part of our psyche which acts according to the Id’s desires in realistic ways, by following the reality principle. It is the part of the psyche which has been directly modified by the influence of the outside world. In relation to the id the ego is that which dethrones the pleasure principle and its chaotic effects and replaces it with the reality principle. By doing so the ego is able to achieve greater and longer security and success. The super-ego is best put as the conscience. it represents moral-restriction and tries to reach the “higher” things of human life.

            By relating what has been previously said about the artist-consumer relationship and the mental parts of the psyche we can now arrive at a determinate view on how art becomes influenced by culture and society. The origin of the painting comes from the impersonal and fixed pleasure principle of the Id. It becomes like a motivational factor for the artist, and “at the other hand of the process of the elaboration and sublimation these elementary intuitions which the work of art represents are clothed in ideologies of the super-ego.” (Read. 92) The super-ego thus preserves past traditions of the people and their race, but which at the same time slowly yields to the influences of the present and new development. The ego becomes that factor which orders everything, it gives a form that combines harmony and structure which combines the amorphous factor of the Id and the moral, cultural and political ideologies that are communicated through the super-ego.

            It is because the artist is able to give a visible, articulated form to the invisible phantasms that he has acquired a power to move us, the consumers, in such a deep manner. But according to Read, “In certain ages society has made the artist an exponent of the moral and ideal emanations of the super-ego, and art has thus become the handmaid of religion or morality or social ideology.” (Read. pg 95) This is why according to Read art is so closely related to religion and social idealism. Society has created an identity for the artist, one that could plead for the cause of morals and ideals by his extraordinary ability to exert and give form to the emanations of the super-ego. Art thus becomes the way to communicate moralities, religious beliefs and social ideology.

            The artist within psycho-analysis thus becomes the medium to a fantasy reality. He, who lives within his fantasy because he is not able to act by both the reality and pleasure principle, creates his work of art in order to communicate and express himself. He deals with the Oedipus complex, with this psycho-tension that is present in him, with art as a mode of relief. He is able to communicate this unconscious mental tension that we all deal with by giving it form with the ego and thus communicate pleasure and relief in the viewer. But also as stated above, the artist is seen, for his extraordinary gift, as a person who is able to communicate and plead for the moralities and ideals that our institutions and cultures creates. And by the nature of the super-ego (from which those moralities and ideologies rise) traditions are preserved and yield to present and new developments. This nature of the super-ego, that of preservation and fixability, along with the pleasure principle of the Id is what makes visual art a very influential form of non-verbal communication. By relating itself to the pleasure principle, our moralities and what we think is right, good and somewhat rational, it is able to communicate ideas at higher level than many other forms of communication. It thus becomes able to communicate ideas and beliefs in a deep, emotional way.

            With this we are now able to understand better how visual art is able to communicate ideas is such a fashion that is both powerful and emotional but at the same time ordered and articulated way. One of the best examples of visual art being a powerful mode of communication in history is the growth of the Nazi party, mainly its growth by the use of propaganda. The Nazy party is indeed very famous for its propaganda. Part of their propaganda plan was focused on the visual aspect of the method, with such they created many influential posters and comics such as Vica defie L’Oncle Sam (Vica defeats Uncle Sam), which illustrated a French Nazi party member. Vica, battling against the allied forces who were portrayed as evil. The way the party used visual propaganda deeply affected their acquisition of power and their ability to control the public. The message they were able to communicate through the use of art was deeply influential and effective, but what is more incredible is the art itself that was used and how it was used. The Nazi poster has many components which are in themselves powerful and influential in communicating a message.

            The first of those was their use of colors. The Nazi poster was many colored with red tones and black lines to portray their message. Both are very powerful colors that represent power, stability, Excitement and energetic. Black was often used to depict and outline the picture of the individual in the picture, in psychology black is a color of “authority and power, Stability and strength. It is also the color associated with intelligence.” (precisionintermedia.com) The use of color also relates to the way the poise of the German was portrayed in the poster. The individual is almost always strong, has a very straight and powerful poise, very healthy and is always pictured in some way or another freeing himself from the oppression of the enemy through the Nazi party. Almost all of the Nazi posters had a red toned attributed to it around the figure portrayed. Hitler has a great understand of how powerful this color was to attract the eyes of the viewer. Red is “often where the eye looks first. Red is the color of energy. It’s associated with movement and excitement. People surrounded by red find their heart beating a little faster and often report feeling a bit out of breath. It’s absolute the wrong color for a baby’s room but perfect to get people excited.” (precisionintermedia.com) On the other hand the poster of the enemy, especially the Jew, is always projected in a dark  toned, hiding, stereotypical and with animal like features that represent them as subhuman that are chaotic and should be affiliated with.

            It is easy using psycho-analytic to see how the German Nazi party rose to power so quickly. Post World War 1 Germany was a devastated country with many problems at its foundation. The artist’s ability to articulate and structure the Id’s pleasure principle was definitely at play in the making of this poster.  Most important is the notion of the super-ego at play within the artist’s psyche; its ability to formulate and represent art as warped around an ideology or morality, in their turn as Freud expresses “perpetuate the past tradition of the race and the people, and which yields but slowly to the influence of the present and to new developments.” (Freud. New Introductory Lectures. pg 100) Because the artist is seen as a person who is able to communicate and plead for moralities and ideals, he thus becomes able to formulate and articulate the super-ego (the conscience created by cultural values) in a way that projects traditions and values that have a deep emotional influences. The values that were transmitted and communicated by the means of the visual art were those of strength and stability which were both desired at a time of crisis for the country and its people. Along with the use of specific colors and themes the Nazi visual propaganda was a deeply influential part of the rising to power in both a physical and mental way.

            This paper explored the ways in which the artist is able to communicate in a deep powerful way, in essence, in a way that can be considered more powerful and efficient than most other forms of communications from the very fact that it deals with the unconscious. The artist being able to interpret and give form to his unconscious there has a tool at his hand that becomes very powerful if used correctly. He is able to appeal emotionally to the viewer through sense perception, which gives it a higher meaning and creates a greater connection.  As seen with the influence of visual art used by the Nazi party, the ability of the artist and the art itself to communicate values, ideas and moralities is quite impressive and powerful. Art thus becomes powerful enough that it is able to create social changes and affect political campaign to an extensive amount.

Works Cited

Aristotle. “The Internet Classics Archive | Poetics by Aristotle.“ The Internet Classics Archive: 441 Searchable Works of Classical Literature. Trans. S. H. Butcher. Web. 27 Apr. 2011. <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/poetics.html>.

Freud, Sigmund. “Introductory Lecture on Psycho-analysis.“ Introductory Lecture on Psycho-analysis. Trans. Joan Riviere. 98+. Print.

Layton, Robert. The Anthropology of Art. New York: Columbia UP, 1981. Print.

Precision Intermedia. “Psychology Of Color.“ Precision Intermedia a Northern California MultiMedia Marketing Agency. Web. 27 Apr. 2011. <http://www.precisionintermedia.com/color.html>.

Read, Herbert. Art and Society. New York: Schocken, 1966. Print.

Reason TV. “The Power of Nazi Propaganda.“ YouTube - Broadcast Yourself. Reason TV, 02 Dec. 2010. Web. 27 Apr. 2011. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Af44Slin7lg>.

Tu me Manques

Il y a des semaines que je ne t’ai vu
des jours ne finissant plus
des nuits interrompues 
par le souvenir 
de ton sourire
par la pensée
d’être avec toi, de te serrer
sans toi je ne suis plus rien
je ne suis que souvenir lointain de toi et moi main dans la main
je rêve du jour ou je te reverrai 
pour voir si tu as changé
si on peut encore s’aimer
tout partager
ne plus pouvoir se séparer
une seule journée
a ne plus pouvoir respirer 
si on est éloignés
se rapprocher
sans pouvoir s’en aller
discuter, sans même parler
je rêve de ce jour,
depuis toujours
sans le voir venir
sans pouvoir agir
je suis anéantie par le fait que tu sois parti
et moi aussi…
je ne peux imaginer ma vie sans toi à mes cotés
pour me réconforter
pour m’écouter 
le fait de penser
que nous sommes éloignés 
me fait tout oublier
même la réalité 
qui est la pour me rappeler
que la vie continue
même si dans la mienne, tu n’es plus…

Why

The creator of a line,

neither straight or curved,

indivisible and unbreakable,

for if it were it could not be distinct,

we would not refer to it

as a medium for answers sought

from unforgotten questions 

that lies within the mind of the individual,

forever to stay motionless until transcended, 

its shadows extends over the light 

over the truth so long sought

over this nirvana, 

or maybe

it just is;

in a state of being and non being

creating an illusion, 

a mirage of the light, 

a false apparition of the sought after,

it is a creator of hope

of an obscured impossibility.

An Essay on the Gift: a contractual notion within time and economy

A gift is a thing of mysterious qualities, it has an element of intent within its essence but should not require one, it becomes part of an economic circle but breaks apart from it. A desire to give a gift for someone is occurrence that is seen as kind and selfless. But the possibility of giving a gift is not too close to reality, it fact it a misconception of reality. The gift does not need any rewards, in fact that need for no reward becomes a sufficient condition for its existence. Although it has no conception of symmetry or reciprocity it is used within a circular revolution of time and economy. In this paper I shall try to explain the true nature of the gift and the harm that it can cause to a relationship between the donor and the other. Also concepts such a time, economy and contractuality will be introduced to expose the beyond the surface of the gift, Death.  

 A gift is an object that comes from the willingness or the desire to give to the other.  It is an object thought to be selflessly given to another person in order to establish a relationship or strengthen an already existing one. It is a given thing that is lost by one person willingly and gained by the other without remorse or need for reward. In order to be a gift it must be in the possession of the donor, a person must acquire and possess the gift before it can be given. In essence it becomes the donor’s property, for if it wasn’t the donor would have no right to give the object and the gift itself would become an object to be taken and not given. One might think that the word take and receive may be similar in relation to the gift, but if a gift was solely taken it would entail that it was not to be received by someone but merely taken by anyone. In simpler words taking something does not need a specific giving or receiving party, it would be available for anyone willing to possess the gift. But a gift has an element of individualization embedded within its giving, a gift is not a gift solely because it is just given willingly but because it is a thought of someone’s character directly correlated with their personality and the donor’s belief of their reaction. Thus the gift is given to her as an object that will be accepted and received, not taken. According to the OED a gift is: “a thing given willingly to someone without payment.” I shall reject the truth of this statement for such definition of a gift would be denying its very nature.  The gift finds its roots within the word “give” and the word “receive,” that we cannot deny, but willingness finds itself nowhere within the essence of a gift, for a gift cannot be given only willingly. If it is true that one does not expect payment from the giving of a gift then how can a will or desire be created from such action?

                By giving a gift an inequality of exchange happens; a thing given must be inherently a thing given away or a thing intentionally lost to the giving away of it as a gift. Such loss, inequality or inequity cannot be paired with the word “willingly” for it would claim that a person would welcome loss as a part of her character. By being able to give willingly without payment there would need to be an unintentional intent of the giving of the gift for it would seem that if one were conscious of her willingness to the giving of the gift she would as well be conscious of a desired intentional loss. Such a person would then be one that would give away her life willingly for nothing in return, no reward and no rational reason. If such would happen then the relation between the giving party and the receiving one would become similar to the relation between a slave and her master. She would lose all freedom to her will to give, a bond servant to a desire that seeks loss. It would then become impossible to gift her anything, for it would be rewarded by the giving of another gift. Such reward can be any responses to the gift, it can be as basic as monetary value or as complicated as the creation of a new relationship.  And such reward would become payment for the gift she has received and thus defy its concept. If she did find a situation where a gift was offered to her, then she would have no choice but to give it back. Her desire to give would create a foundation, for her existence for her gift would be from her to another. Hence the gift would have a primary element of her existence as long as it would be considered a gift. “Seeking through the gesture of the gift to constitute its own unity and, precisely, to get its own identity recognized so that that identity comes back to it, so that it can reappropriate its identity: as its property.”(Derrida, The Time of Kings) 

                In order to stay consistent with her desire to give away, it inherently would mean that she must have disgust of gain, for it would deny her own existence to the other. Because a gift is given away to someone it becomes an affirmation to the receiver of the donor’s relationship with her. But the receiver gains nothing apart from a confirmation of the donor’s existence. It would then follow that she would be able to give her life only for a desire of loss motivated by the affirmation of her own existence. She would become a slave of her desire to give away. But even if you are to reject this past claim, the definition offered but the OED is nothing more but a definition of under what circumstances a gift is given and not necessarily of what a gift is.

I want to come back to the notion of giving for it is found evidently within the gift and addresses the idea of the possibility of the gift. For it is essential to acquire knowledge of the gift’s qualities before being able to define it. A gift is born out of a intent or desire to give whether it is to achieve negative or positive results (that is another question). In order to give there is an elementary notion of receiving for someone cannot give without another receiving. In other words something cannot be given if there is no one to receive it, in the same sense that something cannot be received if nothing has been given. It seems that the two have a reciprocal relation to one another. One cannot be without the other. For a gift to be existing there must be a receiving end to it but also the receiving end must be in compliance with the gift for if it is rejected then it loses its entity as a gift. This means that the gift becomes a contractual object rather than an object that is just given. It becomes a contractual object the moment both parties agree to the giving and the receiving of the gift. It becomes part of the contract not at the moment that the gift is given or received but rather the moment that both parties have agreed to the gift.

                This agreement that is needed for the gift is what makes it a contractual object. The entity must be on agreeable terms for two reasons: (1) if the gift is not agreed upon but still received or given it is then forced by an outside factor which would defy the purpose of a gift and its essence, for as we have seen before the relation between donor and receiver then becomes similar to that of a master and her slave. (2) It would lose its purpose as a gift. Because a gift finds its roots within the words give and receive it is only natural to think that if one of those is negated by the other then the gift would stop being a gift and become a burden.  That which is declined from being given or that which is received forcefully is not a gift for a gift must be an object that can directly be related to the other to which it is given to.  As Emerson says in his essay Gifts “we might convey [a gift] to some person that which properly belonged to his character, and was easily associated with him in thoughts.” (Gifts, Emerson)

Because of its contractual nature, the gift contains a greater element of receiving than giving. A contract is created out of a desire to receive and not out of a desire to give. When someone makes a contract with the other it is so that she can receive what she desires from the other, for she will not agree to receive something that she is not in agreement with. The rejection of a gift would change the gift into a simple object or intent to be taken. Once a gift is rejected, it has been lost by both donor and receiver, for it was already preconceived that the receiving party would accept the gift. But if it is rejected by the other then it has lost its purpose as a gift and the donor cannot make use of its full potentiality, for it was determined to be in the possession of the other. In other words the gift which was given but then rejected becomes an object to be taken. This happens because the gift was associated to the other in thoughts by the donor; this means that the donor would have no use for the gift that was determined to be given. If the donor makes use of the gift it means that she acquired or made a gift that was associated to herself in thought and not the other. Because of this we must not have a conception of the gift that is mostly based upon the giving of the gift, but we must treat the gift as a notion mostly founded upon its desired to be received.

                The contractual nature of the gift also imposes itself on the subject of economy. As Derrida states:

                “Now the gift, if there is any, would no doubt be related to economy. One cannot treat the gift,               this goes without saying, without treating this relation to economy, even to the money   economy” (Derrida, the time of the King)

Economy according to Derrida is a revolution, a circular event that essentially comes back to the law, the nomos, and the home. The Nomos here is not only meant as the law in general but the law of distribution and the law of partition (sharing) as well. In simpler words, Derrida is implying that there are laws when giving and sharing and that those laws revolve in an economical revolution. “As soon as there is law, there is partition: as soon as there is nomy there is economy.” (Derrida, The Time of Kings) In other words the nomos is founded upon an equal distribution and reciprocal partition; it has embedded within its meaning a sense of unity and negotiation. It is there to keep inequality within the oikos (the home). Because of the nomos’ balance that it invokes, economy then becomes a revolution of reciprocal partition. It is circular because it is reciprocal and it is reciprocal because it is circular; just as the sun rises, then falls and then rises again. Because economy is based on exchange it is portrayed within time, for time is the essence for change and thus exchange as well. Since economy is circular this entails that time is as well, for a circular occurrence could not be found inside of a linear event. The notion of circularity is an important one to both my paper and Derrida’s, for it asserts the foundation for which the gift is impossible. The gift, as a contractual exchange, must therefore be in direct relation with the circularity of economy and the nomy, but at the same time breaks the circularity of the economy. Because economy is established as a revolution with time, it means that it would necessarily come back to the home, the starting point. But the gift cannot come back to its starting point for it would deny it of its entity as a gift. A gift cannot be given back; it cannot circulate nor be exchanged, for a gift defies reciprocity and symmetry. The gift would need to keep a sense of alienation to the circle and thus operate outside of economy and time. “It [the gift] must keep a relation of foreignness to the circle. […] It is perhaps in this sense that the gift is the impossible.” (Derrida, The Time of Kings)

                This disruption of the circle of economy and time is a paradox in the occurrence of the giving of the gift. It is temporal and part of the circle but disrupts them. Because the gift happens outside of time it does not happen, it is never happening and cannot happen. It cannot be found in the now since it interrupts the flow of the circle and thus is outside of time. A gift that resists reciprocity and symmetry is therefore impossible to present in the present, for a gift can only be given at the end of time. It can only be given when time stops, for that will be when the circularity of time and economy will cease.

According to Derrida there is a desire to break this circularity, an intentional desire to give a gift. And it is because of that intentionality that the gift cannot be a gift, for the intentionality or desire to give a gift would mean that it also creates contentment for the donor. A sort of fulfillment of the desire to give for a service provided to the receiver. In such an occasion the gift becomes an exchange for an actualization of the donor’s utility, and the receiver of the gift becomes a medium for her desire to give. Her desire to give would then be rewarded by a self-actualization of her existence and of her utility. In this form the gift would then be part of the economic revolution that works within time, and thus it would not be a gift but a mere exchange of services. If a desire to give is originated from someone then the receiver once again obtains the advantage in this contractual circle. In such a case where a desire to give, to break the circle, emerges then the receiver would have the entire power over the gift and the giving of the gift.

                But Derrida fails to give any importance within the contractual notion of the gift to the other although he admits that the notion of the gift is contractual. The other precedes the desire, for a desire of fulfillment to rend a service to the other could not happen without the other. Because of such desire to fulfill, the will to give the gift is already predicated within that desire that a giving will occur, thus the receiving party would have control over the fulfillment desired by the donor. In other words gift would not just be nullified by the intent to be given but also by a possible rejection from the other. The receiver hence has a greater role than the intent to give in order to deny the gift of its entity. If we keep in mind that the gift must be something related to the other in thought as Emerson claimed, then the gift itself would be nullified by the receiver’s desire to receive. If the gift is not accordingly chosen in unity with the receiving party’s desire then it was never a gift. It would be a burdened object imposed by the relationship between the other and the donor. If my mother offered me a gift, if it were possible, that did not comply with what I desired to receive, it would never actualize itself as a gift, but I would be burdened by the ethical relationship that my mother and I have with one another and accept the offer. A response to the gift, either positive or negative, is necessary for its actualization to occur. If no response is given to the gift then it is not a gift, for no receiving party has acknowledged it as received. If no one acknowledges the gift as received then it was never given, thus it would not be a gift but an object to be taken by anyone. But even if a response to the gift was given by the other, then it would become a counter-gift, an actualization of the gift within economy and time. This actualization of the gift within time and economy would therefore make it by its definition, not a gift.

                I would like to look deeper into an aspect of the gift considered by neither Emerson nor Derrida. As we have affirmed the gift is a contractual thing actualized within time and economy that defies symmetry and circularity. Hence a gift is impossible due to the fact that it is that which “happens” outside of time and because of its intent to be given and responded to.  The gift is a contract between donor and receiver, a contractualization of a thing (Une contractualization d’une chose). By simplifying the word contractualization into two words contra- and -actualization we find that the very element of the contract made between a donor and the other the gift becomes the impossibility.  The word contra- comes from the Latin “in opposition” and -actualization which is the same word in both French and English meaning “the making real or give the appearance of reality to” (Princeton dictionary). In essence by its contractualization the gift is an opposition to an appearance of reality. It is a thing that is opposite to the ability of making real (une opposition de la realitee). As the French say, the contract between giver and receiver is un contrat avec le diable (a deal with the devil). It is that which is deceiving and malevolent. It might be a contract that intends goodness but would reveal itself as an unexpected harmful actualization. The Gift thus becomes a deceiving actualization of the desire with a fulfillment created by the giving of das Gift (poison).

                This opposition to an actualization of the gift thus becomes a misleading notion of what we seem to think of gifts and their initial intentional purposes. A purpose that is exists to strengthen or create a relationship between one and the other, but corrodes it away with implications of duty and self-fulfillment. The giving of gift then becomes an economical commodity that is used to strengthen self rather than the other. It is an event that is hidden in between the surface of the gift a combination of kindness and selflessness that hides the destructive nature of the giving of the gift. it is a concept of goodness that will eventually lead to death, for the only actualization that the gift can offer the self is death. In other words, the actualization of the individual self would be confirmed by her own dying, for the only one that will experience her death is herself.

                “My irreplaceability is therefore conferred, delivered, “given,” one could say by death. It is the                 same as a gift, the same source, one could say the same goodness and the law. It is from the          perspective of death as the place of my irreplaceability, that is, of my singularity, that I feel   called to responsibility” (Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death)

As seen here all the notions of the gift are found in the quote above: a “given”, “irreplaceability”, “goodness”, “death” and “responsibility” (in the sense of a response to the gift). It is, almost in a sense, like Derrida is comparing himself to the gift, irreplaceable, given, good and called to be responded upon. And the only actualization of his individuality is death for he is the only one who will suffer his own death.

Works Cited

1.      Derrida, Jacques, and Jacques Derrida. “Beyond: Giving for the Taking And Learning to    Give; Death.” The Gift of Death ; &, Literature in Secret. Chicago: University of          Chicago, 2008. 37-53. Print.

2.      Dictionary, Oxford. “Gift.” Oxford Dictionaries. Web. <http://oxforddictionaries.com?attempted=true>.

3.      Emerson, Ralph W. “The Gift.” The Logic of the Gift. NY: Routledge, 1997. 25-27. Print.

4.      Schrift, Alan D., comp. “The Time of the King.” The Logic of the Gift: toward an Ethic      of Generosity. By Jacques Derrida. New York: Routledge, 2008. 121-47. Print.